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A stable international monetary system has emerged since the early 1990s.  A large number of industrial
and a growing number of developing countries now have domestic inflation targets administered by
independent and transparent central banks.  These countries place few restrictions on capital mobility
and allow their exchange rates to float.  The domestic focus of monetary policy in these countries does
not have any obvious international cost.  Inflation targeters have lower exchange rate volatility and
less frequent sudden stops of capital flows than similar countries that do not target inflation.  Inflation
targeting countries also do not have current accounts or international reserves that look different from
other countries.  This system was not planned and does not rely on international coordination.  There
is no role for a center country, the IMF, or gold.  It is durable; in contrast to other monetary regimes,
no country has been forced to abandon an inflation-targeting regime.  Succinctly, it is the diametric
opposite of the post-war system; Bretton Woods, reversed.
Andrew K. Rose





1. Motivation and Introduction 
  All countries choose their monetary policy.  Collectively, the interaction of these policies 
constitutes the international monetary system.  For instance, during the “Bretton Woods” regime 
after WWII, countries fixed their exchange rates to the American dollar.  A fixed exchange rate 
is a well-defined monetary policy that is still used by a number of countries.  In the presence of 
capital mobility, it subordinates monetary policy to the objective of exchange rate stability at the 
expense of other domestic interests.  Because of this conflict, most fixed exchange rates do not 
stayed fixed for long.  But when countries float their exchange rates, they have to choose another 
monetary regime; floating is not a coherent monetary policy.  Some countries have tried to 
pursue money growth targets, often without success.  Others have hybrid strategies involving 
multiple or moving targets; some countries do not even have clearly-defined monetary policies. 
  Fourteen of the thirty OECD countries currently have a monetary policy that explicitly 
targets inflation.  These countries have a combined population exceeding 430 million, and 
produce over an eighth of global output, so inflation targeting is an important monetary policy.  
But even these impressive numbers understate the importance of inflation targeting (hereafter 
“IT”).  Twelve OECD countries are in EMU, which is almost a formal inflation targeter 
(Wyplosz, 2006), and may become one soon; another pair (Denmark and the Slovak Republic) 
are waiting to join EMU.
1  The United States has been an implicit IT country for years 
(Goodfriend, 2003), and may become an explicit one soon.  There is speculation that Japan may 
adopt IT when its deflationary days are definitively over.  So the entire OECD may soon be 
using the same monetary strategy. 
But inflation targeting is not simply a policy of rich countries.  As of June 2006, ten 
developing countries with 750 million people have also adopted IT.  Altogether, countries that   2
formally target inflation currently constitute over a quarter of the global economy.  And IT is not 
only important but likely to grow in significance as the remaining OECD and more developing 
countries adopt it.  
This paper examines the implications of this widespread policy for the international 
monetary system. 
 
Targeting Inflation, Floating Exchange Rates 
Mishkin (2004) lists five components to an inflation targeting regime: 
1.  The public announcement of medium-term numerical targets for inflation, 
2.  An institutional commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, 
3.  An information-inclusive strategy to set policy instruments, 
4.  Increased transparency of the monetary policy strategy, and 
5.  Increased accountability of central bank for attaining its inflation objectives. 
 
While inflation targeting has been defined in different ways, most are similar.  Table A1 lists IT 
countries, along with the dates that the IT regime began.  It is not always clear precisely when an 
IT regime began, and scholars sometimes disagree about these dates.  For instance, Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) date the start of Australia’s IT regime to September 1994 whereas the 
Reserve Bank of Australia dates it to March 1993.
2  Accordingly, I tabulate a default date that 
represents my best judgment as to when IT began, along with a conservative date.  These are 
typically close together.
3 
An inflation targeting regime usually entails a floating exchange rate (Taylor, 2001).  
Insofar as inflation targeting countries use a formal intermediate target for monetary policy, it is 
the inflation forecast, rather than, e.g., the exchange rate or money growth rate (Bernanke and 
Mishkin, 1997).  Most IT countries let their exchange rates float quite freely.  A typical 
statement comes from the Bank of Israel, which states that “the Bank of Israel has adopted a   3
strategy of no direct intervention in the determination of the exchange rate. This means allowing 
the exchange rate to fluctuate continuously in response to financial and economic changes …”
4  
The Norwegian central bank has not intervened since January 1999, the Canadian since 
September 1998, the Israeli since June 1997, and the British have intervened only once since 
September 1997.
5  New Zealand has not intervened in the foreign exchange market in over 
twenty years!
6  There are exceptions of course; the Reserve Bank of Australia intervened in the 
1990s, the developing countries sometimes intervene, and a few have even maintained exchange 
rate targets for a while along with their inflation target.  But the trend is clearly towards flexible 
rates; when countries do intervene, the IT countries now do so in order to hit their inflation 
targets, not to maintain fixed exchange rates.
7 
So the international monetary system seems likely to be increasingly dominated by IT 
countries with floating exchange rates.  Despite the relatively youth of this system, some of its 
properties have been already studied from a theoretical viewpoint; see e.g., Benigno and Benigno 
(2005, 2006) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002).  The characteristics of IT countries have been 
studied empirically, and much is now known about monetary policy under IT; see, e.g., Ball and 
Sheridan (2003), Bernanke et al (1999), IMF (2005), Levin et al (2004), and Siklos (1999).  
However, the focus of empirical work in IT is almost always on domestic aspects of IT, such as 
the level, volatility, or persistence of inflation or output.  There has been little positive analysis 
of the international effects of IT.  Accordingly, the focus of this paper is empirical and 
international, rather than normative or domestic.  
 
2. Inflation Targeting: A Durable Monetary Regime   4
  Inflation targeting has proven to be quite durable.  Twenty-three countries adopted 
inflation targets by the end of 2004 (another four have joined in the eighteen months following).  
Only two of those – Finland and Spain – have abandoned IT.  Both left to join EMU in 1999, 
neither under economic duress (and the ECB maintains an inflation target).  This stands in stark 
contrast to alternative monetary regimes experienced since WWII, which have been plagued by 
crisis and failure, and accordingly transient.  Fixed exchange rate regimes do not stay fixed 
forever!  Other monetary strategies – such as money growth targets, multiple targets, or hybrid 
strategies – also tend to be short lived, unsuccessful, or both. 
  Describing IT as a durable policy may seem like a bold assertion.  After all, New Zealand 
adopted the first IT strategy only in 1990.  As of June 2006 we have at most sixteen years of 
experience with inflation targeting.  This is especially true of developing countries.  Chile started 
to target inflation in 1991, but many developing countries that have been targeting inflation have 
done so for only a short while. 
Still, looking back over the last century, sixteen years turns out to be a long time for a 
monetary regime.  Writing before the currency crises of the late 1990s, Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1995) forcefully pointed out how very transient modern fixed exchange rate regimes seem to 
be.
8  Even the Bretton Woods regime of capital controls and fixed but adjustable pegged 
exchange rates lasted less than thirteen years, from  January 1959 (when European currencies 
became convertible for current account transactions) through the crisis of August 1971.
9  (Even 
this period was far from smooth; Germany and the Netherlands revalued in 1961, the UK and 
France devalued in 1967 and 1969 respectively, while Germany floated and then revalued in 
1969.
10)  And most regimes that target money growth have not survived even that long.
11 
   5
How Long do Exchange Rate Regimes Last? 
It is not possible to sensibly estimate the reasons why countries crash out of IT regimes, 
since none ever has.
12  Still, one can compare the durability of IT with that of monetary regimes 
chosen by other (non-IT) countries during the same period of time.  Accordingly, I form a 
“control group” of country x year observations for the period since IT began in early 1990 
through the end of most usable data in 2004.  To ensure that the members of the control group 
can be reasonably compared with the IT countries, I restrict my attention to non-IT countries 
with a) real GDP per capita at least as high as those of the poorest IT country in 2000, and b) 
population at least as big as those of the smallest IT country.
13  From the universe of all countries 
with their own money, I form a set of 42 control group countries.
14  Since Iceland (the smallest 
IT country) is something of a size outlier, as a sensitivity check I also exclude countries smaller 
than New Zealand (the second-smallest IT country) but larger than Iceland.
15  The members of 
the control group are tabulated in Table A2; “small” countries (defined as those whose 2000 
population lay between Iceland and New Zealand) are marked.
16 
In Table A2 I also provide the most recent available IMF information on the monetary 
framework, as well as the number of changes in exchange rate regimes experienced by each of 
the control group countries.
17  I use two different exchange rate regime classifications.  The first 
is the well-known data set of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), hereafter “LYS”, who use a 
combination of exchange rate behavior and central bank intervention to create a five-way 
classification of regimes (float, dirty float, crawling peg, fix, and inconclusive).  The second data 
set is also well-known, and was created by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), hereafter “RR”, by 
comparing exchange rate behavior over time for official and market rates to create a 14-way   6
classification of exchange regimes.
18  The annual LYS data are available from 1990 through the 
end of 2004, while the monthly RR data extend only through 2001.
19 
There are clearly issues associated with these measures of monetary policy regimes.  
First, the samples considered by LYS and RR do not coincide.
20  Second, there are differences 
between the classifications thrown out by the two systems.  For instance LYS count 7 switches 
of exchange rate regime for Belarus between 1990 and 2004; in contrast, RR have none between 
1990 and 2001.  (The discrepancy may be more imagined than real, since RR classify Belarus as 
“freely falling” throughout, thus essentially agreeing with LYS that Belarus conducted unstable 
monetary policy continuously).  Most significantly, it is possible that switches in the monetary 
regime need not be reflected in either the RR or LYS classifications.  One would like to have 
measures of monetary policy regimes rather than exchange rate regimes; to repeat, a fixed 
exchange rate provides a nominal anchor for monetary policy, but a float does not.  Thus in both 
data sets, a country that maintains a floating exchange rate and moves into or out of (say) a 
money growth target may show no change in its exchange rate regime.
21  So the RR and LYS are 
noisy measures of switches in monetary regimes, and are likely to understate the actual amount 
change in a country’s monetary regime.
22 
Still, even a naïve look at Table A2 shows just how unstable most monetary policies have 
been.  Many of the 42 countries in the control group have experienced numerous changes in the 
exchange rate regime.  For instance, Jamaica switched regimes eleven times in fifteen years 
according to the LYS method, and five in the twelve available years of RR data.  Only five 
countries experienced no changes under either classification.  Of these, Morocco targets M1 
growth, and maintains an exchange rate peg with many controls against a secret multilateral 
basket, while Syria maintains an exchange rate peg but with many controls and multiple   7
exchange rates.  So there are only three relevant countries with monetary regimes as durable as 
inflation targeting.  One is Hong Kong’s successful currency board.  The IMF describes the other 
two – Japan and the United States – as having “no explicitly stated nominal anchor, but 
monitoring various indicators in conducting monetary policy.”
23 
It is possible to look at the data on exchange rate regime switches more comprehensively 
and rigorously.  I use standard statistical techniques (see e.g., Gopinath and Rigobon, 2006) and 
define three measures of regime persistence as: 
 
Average Probability of Regime Change, country i:  ∑ ≡ i i i ns Observatio regchanges p / # ˆ  
Average time in Regime, country i:  ∑ ≡ i i i regimes me Timeinregi t / ~  
Spell-weighted Avg time in Regime, country i:  ∑ ≡ i i i ns Observatio me Timeinregi t / ) ( ˆ 2  
 
where: #regchangesi is the number of regime changes for country i, Observationsi is the number 
of (country*period) observations, Timeinregime is the time spent inside in a regime, and regimes 
is the total number of regimes.  
The average probability of regime change may be uninteresting if a small number of 
countries dominates the sample.  The second measure uses each regime as a spell of time, and is 
simply the inverse of the probability of change.  The third measure corrects the second one for 
bias by weighting observations by the length of the regime; Gopinath and Rigobon provide more 
details and an example.   
I construct my measures for each country in the control group, and tabulate in Table 1 
simple averages computed across countries.  Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) present two 
(similar) exchange rate regime classifications; one uses three “buckets” while the other uses five.    8
I use both, as well as the RR classification.  To ensure robustness, I also calculate the statistics 
after excluding the small countries identified in Table A1.  Thus there are six (= three regime 
classifications x with/without small countries) different estimates tabulated for each statistic. 
The estimates of Table 1 give a strong impression that exchange rate regimes for the 
control group countries have not lasted long.  The exact estimates vary a little depending on 
whether one uses the LYS or RR classification of exchange rate regimes.  The RR scheme shows 
a lower probability of regime change, and a longer average time between regime switches.  Still, 
the most striking finding is how transient exchange rate regimes are.  The probability of a regime 
changing within a year is over a quarter if ones uses the LYS scheme, so that the average regime 
lasts three years or less.  Using the RR classification increases durability some, as does 
weighting the average time spent in a regime.  But overall, exchange rate regimes seem to be 
ephemeral phenomena.  Nothing much depends on whether one uses the 3- or 5-bucket LYS 
measure, or whether one includes or excludes small countries. 
I supplement the three statistical measures presented in Table 1 with survivorship data in 
Table 2.  I tabulate the probability of exchange rate regimes surviving for different periods of 
time, in particular through two, four, six and eight years.  To check the sensitivity of my results, I 
again use all three exchange rate regime classifications, and both include and exclude small 
countries.  Since there are different ways to treat the interaction between countries and exchange 
rate regimes, I produce three sets of results.  In the top panel, I treat countries as having country-
specific characteristics since countries may have different probabilities of having exchange rate 
regimes survive.  Alternatively, one can treat each exchange rate regime as an independent 
observation, as I do in the middle panel.  Finally, one can consider only the regime that a country 
began the sample with, and determine the probability of that initial regime surviving.   9
No matter how you chop up the data, the impression one gets from Table 2 echoes that of 
Table 1; exchange rate regimes tend to be fleeting.  The default results of Table 2a indicate that 
the probability of a regime surviving even eight years is below .3; for the 5-regime LYS scheme, 
it is below .1.  The exact survivorship rates vary somewhat, but essentially all are low even six or 
eight years out.  This implies that the data we have on the duration of existing IT countries is 
starting to be of meaningful duration.  Nine IT regimes have already survived eight years; if 
inflation targeting was comparable in durability to an exchange rate regime, this would be 
extremely unlikely.
24   I conclude that IT has already proven to be a durable monetary regime, in 
stark contrast to exchange rate regimes.
25 
 
3. Bretton Woods, Reversed 
  A number of IT countries are currently in an apparently durable monetary regime; this is 
the most striking contrast with previous international monetary systems such as the Bretton 
Woods system.  But there are many others.  In fact, there are so many points of comparisons 
between the features of the Bretton Woods system and the behavior of the inflation targeters that 
I have collected them together in Table 3.   
Most of the differences are straightforward between the systems are straightforward.  
Mundell’s celebrated “Incompatible Trinity” states that fixed exchange rates, free capital flows 
and a domestic focus for monetary policy are desirable goals that are mutually exclusive.  Most 
IT countries have liberalized capital markets and relinquished control over their exchange rates, 
the exact opposite of the Bretton Woods system.
26  Since the IT countries float, there is typically 
no important role for public capital flows any more; speculative activity on the foreign exchange 
markets revolves around floaters, not speculators trying to attack a country’s fixed rate.  And the   10
increased volume of private capital flows has allowed the system to handle large sustained 
current account imbalances, which are proportionately larger now than during the Bretton Woods 
regime. 
The current system seems to be delivering different (often better) economic outcomes 
than the Bretton Woods regime.  But it is also interesting to trace the history of the system.  The 
Bretton Woods system was deliberately planned, the outcome of a long series of negotiations 
between eminent economists representing the interests of critical countries.  “Bretton Woods” 
itself is the name of the resort town in New Hampshire where the conference delegates signed 
the agreements for the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the ITO/GATT in July 
1944. 
The deliberate design and construction of the Bretton Woods system can be contrasted 
with the evolution of the current system.  Countries that adopt IT do not agree to join an 
internationally recognized monetary system and do not accept commonly accepted “rules of the 
game” either implicitly or explicitly.  Rather, the system has grown in a more Darwinian style, 
simply because of its manifest success.  International cooperation is simply not a key part of the 
current international monetary system.  This is another difference with the Bretton Woods 
system which required massive international cooperation to function.
27  Accordingly, many of 
the key institutions of the Bretton Woods system are now essentially irrelevant.  The 
International Monetary Fund has evolved into a crisis-manager for developing countries (often 
those suffering speculative attacks on their fixed exchange rate regimes), and plays no real role 
in the new system.  There is no special role for a center or anchor country like the United States 
– that is, no “N/N-1 problem.”  Gold is irrelevant (as is the SDR).  Developing countries are 
participating more quickly and fully in the system than they did under Bretton Woods.  The key   11
players are central banks; these are now more independent, accountable and transparent than 
under Bretton Woods. 
One final point is of interest.  Serious objections had been made to the Bretton Woods 
system by well-known economists long before its demise.  Robert Triffin observed as early as 
1947 that the system had a tendency to meet the demand for reserves through the growth of 
foreign dollar balances, making it dynamically unstable.  Milton Friedman famously made the 
case for floating exchange rates in 1950, a case emphatically echoed by Harry Johnson in 1969.  
By way of contrast, there is a much greater alignment of IT with academic thought.  Indeed, 
much of the case for inflation targeting was made by distinguished academics including Ben 
Bernanke, Rick Mishkin, and Lars Svensson. 
 
4. Exchange Rate Volatility 
  Inflation targeting requires exchange rate flexibility.  But do countries with IT experience 
systematically higher exchange rate volatility in practice?  Does the domestic focus of monetary 
policy under IT impose a “cost” on the country in the form of substantially higher exchange rate 
volatility?  Many countries seem to have a “fear of floating” (especially in developing countries); 
when they adopt IT, are their fears justified?  Or does the presence of a durable monetary 
framework eliminate policy shocks that cause exchange rate volatility?  I now attempt to answer 
such questions by comparing exchange rate volatility between the IT and control group 
countries.
28 
  I use multilateral (effective) exchange rates for both IT and control group countries from 
the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics data set.  I use both nominal 
(IFS line “neu” for industrial countries, “nec” for developing countries) and real exchange rate   12
measures; the latter are based on relative CPIs (IFS line “rec”).  The series are available monthly 
from 1990 through December 2005.  Data on nominal effective exchange rates are available for 
45 IT and control group countries, while real rates are available for 42 of them (the three missing 
are Hong Kong, SAR China; the Dominican Republic, and Lebanon). 
To measure volatility, I take natural logarithms of effective exchange rates, and then 
estimate the standard deviation of a country’s log effective exchange rate over an interval of 
time.  The appropriate period for the data is not obvious, so I use three alternatives to split the 
data into sensible mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive periods.  First, for each country I 
estimate four standard deviations, one over each four-year long period between January 1990 and 
December 2005.  (Thus the first standard deviation for Australia is estimated using data from 
1990m1 through 1993m12; the second one from 1994m1 through 1997m12 and so forth.)  
Second, for each country I estimate two standard deviations, one from each of the two eight-year 
periods.  Finally, for each country I estimate one standard deviation over the entire sixteen year 
period.  Thus, at (say) the four-year horizon I have observations from a number of different IT 
and control-group countries, each contributing a maximum of four observations over time.
29  I 
use all available data for the control group countries, and the IT regime observations for the IT 
countries.
30 
  I then regress exchange rate volatility on a binary dummy variable which is one for 
countries that use IT, and zero otherwise.  I use OLS and also include an intercept, time-specific 
fixed effects, and a set of control variables.  That is, I estimate: 
 
it jit j j t t t it it X T IT eer Vol ε δ γ α β + Σ + Σ + + = ) ( 
   13
where: Vol(eer)it is the volatility of the effective exchange rate for country i over period t, ITit is 
a dummy variable that is one if i is an inflation targeter over period t and zero otherwise, Tt is a 
period-specific fixed effect, Xjit is a set of controls, ε is a well-behaved disturbance term, and α, 
γ, and δ are nuisance parameters. The regressors that I include as controls are the average values 
of: 1) the current account (expressed as a percentage of GDP); 2) the natural logarithm of 
openness (exports plus imports, again as a percentage of GDP); 3) log population; and 4) log 
PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita.  The data for the control variables are all taken from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
31 
Table 4 reports coefficient estimates for this dummy variable, along with standard errors 
in parentheses; estimates that are significantly different from zero at the .05 (.01) level are 
marked by one (two) asterisk(s).  A negative coefficient indicates that exchange rate volatility is 
lower under IT.  There are six columns of results.  Three use the nominal exchange rate to 
construct the dependent variable at the 4- 8- and 16-year intervals; the other three use the real 
exchange rate (at the same intervals). 
A caveat.  Since I ignore how countries choose their monetary regime, I am implicitly 
ignoring potential simultaneity and selection issues.  Since not all countries have adopted it, 
inflation targeting is clearly not a panacea.
32  But as no IT regimes have yet failed, we cannot 
seriously address the reasons why they might fail with quantitative tools.  More generally, we do 
not currently have a good understanding of how countries choose their monetary regime in 
practice.  This is a fruitful area for future research. 
The default estimates are presented in the top row of the table.  All six coefficients are 
negative, though only one is significantly different from zero (for nominal exchange rate 
volatility using a single cross-section of volatility calculated over all sixteen years of data).  Still,   14
the striking feature is that the coefficients are negative at all.  This implies that exchange rate 
volatility (both real and nominal) is actually lower for IT countries than for the control group, 
some of whom maintain fixed exchange rate regimes! 
An additional twelve rows present a variety of robustness checks.  The first few change 
the default specification by successively dropping: 1) the time-specific fixed effects; 2) the four 
controls; and 3) just the population and current account controls.  I also try a specification where 
the level rather than the log of openness is used.  I then handle outliers in two different ways.  
First, I drop all observations where the residual is large (more than 1.5 standard deviations from 
the mean).  Second, I use a quantile (least absolute deviations) estimator.  The next three 
experiments change the sample by dropping: 1) small countries, 2) poor countries (those with 
real GDP per capita below $5000), and 3) the four countries that switched to IT after 2004.  I 
then weight observations by log real GDP.   The final two checks change the regressand so as to 
measure volatility in different ways.  Since the nominal effective exchange rate could be non-
stationary, I calculate my standard deviations from the first-difference of natural logarithms.  As 
an additional robustness check, I then replace the standard deviation of the log of the nominal 
effective exchange rate with the mean absolute first-difference of the log exchange rate.  None of 
this sensitivity analysis undermines the initial finding.  Of the 64 coefficients presented, only five 
are positive, none significantly so.  Seventeen of the 64 coefficients are significantly negative at 
the .05 level, eight of these at the .01 level.   
To summarize: exchange rate volatility for IT countries is typically (though often 
insignificantly) lower for IT countries than for others.  That is, the domestic focus of inflation 
targeting does not seem to come at the expense of higher exchange rate volatility. 
   15
5. “Sudden Stops” of Capital Inflows 
  There has been much discussion in the literature recently concerning “sudden stops” of 
international capital.  These dramatic shifts in capital flows are often associated with 
considerable economic distress, and have thus been examined extensively; Calvo, Izquierdo and 
Talvi (2006) provide a recent treatment.  Accordingly, I now briefly examine whether IT 
countries have the same propensity to be affected by sudden stops as non-IT countries.
33 
  Since there is no universally-accepted definition of sudden stops, I examine a number of 
definitions.  In particular, I use five sets of sudden stop dates – all that I could find – from Calvo, 
Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004), Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2006), Eichengreen, Gupta and Mody 
(2006), Frankel and Cavallo (2004), and Frankel and Wei (2004).  These dates differ in a number 
of respects, including the countries and periods covered, the method of identifying sudden stops, 
and so forth. 
  Table 5a presents a tabulation of the 294 observations in my sample that overlap with 
Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004).  Each (country x year) observation can be classified by 
whether it is a) a sudden stop or not (in which case it is labeled “tranquil”); and b) its monetary 
regime: control observation (for non-IT countries); IT observation; or a pre-IT observation (for 
the observations before the country changed to IT).  The other definitions of sudden stops are 
presented in panels 5b-5e. 
  It is apparent from all five panels that it is rare for an IT country to experience a sudden 
stop.  For instance, Table 5a indicates that the Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004) definition 
delivers only one sudden stop for an IT country out of the 94 possible observations.  However, 
eight of the 72 possible control-group observations are sudden stops.  Further, in the 128 
observations available before the IT countries switched to inflation targeting, they experienced   16
nine sudden stops.  For all five definitions of sudden stops, IT countries were less likely to 
experience sudden stops than they were either a) before they switched to inflation targeting, or b) 
compared with the control-group countries with other monetary regimes. 
  That said, sudden stops are rare events, so that these differences are usually statistically 
insignificant; only the Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004) register at conventional levels.  The 
last panel of Table 5 presents formal t-tests for equality of frequency of sudden stops, along with 
the associated p-values.  The first row tests the hypothesis of equal frequency of sudden stops 
between control-group and IT countries; a positive t-statistic indicates that control group 
observations were more likely to experience sudden stops than IT countries.  The second row 
compares pre- and post-IT observations for countries that adopted IT between 1990 and 2004; a 
negative value indicates that the frequency of sudden stops fell after the adoption of inflation 
targeting.  IT countries experienced fewer sudden stops than either the period before they 
adopted IT, or than comparable countries with other monetary regimes, but only two of the ten 
differences are statistically significant. 
  Succinctly, countries that switch to inflation targeting experience a drop in the frequency 
of sudden stops.  Sudden stops are also less common in inflation targeters than they are in control 
group countries.  These differences are usually statistically insignificant, which seems 
unsurprising given the rarity of sudden stops.  Still, they support the conjecture that the financial 
crises that plagued the world in the 1990s may soon be a thing of the past. 
 
6. Reserves and Current Accounts 
  There is much interest these days in reserve accumulation and current account 
imbalances, especially for East Asian economies.  Accordingly it is interesting to examine the   17
behavior of international reserves and current account imbalances, especially to compare the IT 
and control group countries. 
  I use two conventional measures of international reserves.  The more traditional one 
compares international reserves with trade flows by measuring reserves in months of imports.  
The newer convention is to measure broad money (M2) as a ratio to reserves.  The current 
account is measured as a percentage of GDP, positive figures indicating surpluses.  The data are 
annual WDI series, available from 1990 through 2004. 
  To smooth out the data, I construct (country-specific) averages over time for the three 
variables of interest (M2/reserves, reserves in import months, and the current account as a 
percentage of GDP).  I follow the strategy I used for exchange rate volatility, and compute my 
averages over each four-year periods (1990-93, 1994-97, 1998-2001, and 2002-04), eight-year 
periods (1990-97, 1998-2004), and the whole sample (1990-2004).  For each sample, I then 
tabulate the averages for IT countries, and for the control group countries.  These are presented 
in the top rows of Table 6; the three panels correspond to the three variables of interest.  
  Average values for reserves and current accounts for IT countries are generally close to 
those for the control group.  Reserves look smaller for the IT countries compared with the 
control group, but only really for the mid-1990s and when normalized by money.  Reserves look 
similar between IT and other countries for other samples, or when normalized by trade.  The 
differences are never statistically significant; simple t-tests cannot reject the hypothesis of equal 
means at standard confidence levels.  Similarly, current account imbalances also look similar 
across IT and control group countries. 
  The average values mask considerable dispersion across countries.  For instance, even if 
one restricts attention to the control group during the 1990-93 period, Jordan averaged a current   18
account deficit of 10.5% of GDP, while Singapore maintained a mean current account surplus of 
9.7%.  Even if the average values are similar across IT and control group countries, other parts of 
the distribution may be different.  To test this hypothesis rigorously, I conduct non-parametric 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of distributions between the IT and control group 
countries.  The p-values for the hypothesis of equal distributions are tabulated in Table 6.  With 
the exception noted above (M2/Reserves in the mid-1990s), the hypothesis of equal distribution 
cannot be rejected at conventional levels. 
  To summarize, reserves and current account imbalances for inflation targeters look 
similar to those of the control group.  Again, the domestic focus of monetary policy under IT 
does not have significant consequences for key features of the international monetary landscape. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  Countries have a limited number of choices for their monetary strategy.  Historically a 
large but declining number of countries have fixed their exchange rates.  A number of countries 
have experimented with the idea of setting money growth targets.  Some countries pursue hybrid 
or ill-defined strategies.  And an increasing number of countries grant their central banks 
independence to pursue a domestic inflation target.   
Inflation targeters let their exchange rates float, usually without controls on capital flows 
and often without intervention.  Because the goal of monetary policy is aligned with national 
interests, inflation targeting seems remarkably durable, especially by way of contrast with the 
alternatives.  It is striking that no country has ever been forced to abandon an inflation-targeting 
regime.  But the domestic focus of inflation targeting does not seem to have observable 
international costs.  Countries that target inflation experience lower exchange rate volatility and   19
fewer “sudden stops” of capital flows than their counterparts; nor do they have different current 
accounts imbalances, or reserve levels. 
As a result of its manifest success, inflation targeting has continued to spread; it now 
includes a number of developing countries as well as a large chunk of the OECD.  Indeed the 
spread of this monetary strategy has been remarkably fast in the conservative world of monetary 
policy.  The system of domestically-oriented monetary policy with floating exchange rates and 
capital mobility was not formally planned.  It does not have a central role for the United States, 
gold, or the International Monetary Fund.  In short, it is the diametric opposite of the postwar 
system; Bretton Woods, reversed. 
  Sustainability is currently the biggest policy issue in international monetary affairs.  
There is much heated discussion over global imbalances and the Chinese-American exchange 
rate; is there a “revived” Bretton Woods system?  In the midst of this debate, we should not lose 
sight of the resilience and stability of the emerging international monetary system, which can be 
accurately described as “Bretton Woods, reversed.”   20
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Table 1: Durability of Exchange Rate Regimes for Control Group Countries 
 
Table 1a: Average Probability of Regime Change 
  All Observations  Excluding Small Countries 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 3-regime  .27 annually  .27 annually 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 5-regime  .32 annually  .33 annually 
Reinhart-Rogoff  .01 monthly  .01 monthly 
 
Table 1b: Average Time Between Regime Changes 
  All Observations  Excluding Small Countries 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 3-regime  3.0 years  2.9 years 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 5-regime  2.6 years  2.5 years 
Reinhart-Rogoff  51.8 months (4.3 years)  58.2 months (4.9 years) 
 
Table 1c: Spell-Weighted Average Time Between Regime Changes 
  All Observations  Excluding Small Countries 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 3-regime  6.3 years  6.1 years 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 5-regime  6.0 years  5.7 years 
Reinhart-Rogoff  55.4 months (4.6 years)  67.0 months (5.6 years) 
 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger data set available from http://www.utdt.edu/~ely/Base_2005.zip 
Reinhart-Rogoff data set available from http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/faculty/reinhart/monthly1.dta 
   23
Table 2: Survivorship of Exchange Rate Regimes for Control Group Countries 
 
Table 2a: Treating Multiple Regimes as Country-Specific 








Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 3-regime  .71 .42 .27 .13 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 3-regime, without small  .64 .39 .28 .13 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 5-regime  .69 .37 .20 .08 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 5-regime, without small  .61 .34 .20 .07 
Reinhart-Rogoff  .73 .49 .35 .20 
Reinhart-Rogoff, without small  .76 .58 .47 .29 
 
Table 2b: Multiple Regimes Independently 








Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 3-regime  .35 .21 .13 .09 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 3-regime, without small  .32 .20 .12 .08 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 5-regime  .25 .16 .10 .07 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 5-regime, without small  .23 .14 .09 .06 
Reinhart-Rogoff  .64 .40 .28 .19 
Reinhart-Rogoff, without small  .65 .45 .37 .25 
 
Table 2c: Allowing Each Country to have Starting Regime 








Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 3-regime  .91 .73 .48 .39 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 3-regime, without small  .88 .71 .50 .38 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 5-regime  .91 .72 .47 .38 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 5-regime, without small  .87 .70 .48 .35 
Reinhart-Rogoff  .72 .56 .41 .26 
Reinhart-Rogoff, without small  .73 .63 .53 .33 
 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger data set available from http://www.utdt.edu/~ely/Base_2005.zip 
Reinhart-Rogoff data set available from http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/faculty/reinhart/monthly1.dta   24
Table 3: Features of International Monetary Systems 
   Bretton Woods  Inflation Targeting 
1 Regime  Durability  Low  High 
2  Exchange Rate Regime  Fixed  Floating 
3  Focus of Monetary Policy  International (at least in part)  Wholly Domestic 
4  Intermediate Target  Exchange Rate  None/Inflation Forecast 
5 Capital  Mobility  Controlled  Relatively  unrestricted 
6  Capacity for Current 
Account Imbalances 
Limited High 
7 System  Design  Planned  Unplanned 
8  International Cooperation  Necessary  Not required 
9  Role of IMF  Key in principle  Small 
10  Role of Gold  Key in principle  Negligible 
11  Role of US as Center Country  Key in practice  Small 
12  Key Members  Essentially Large and Northern OECD/LDCs, often small 
13 Central  Banks  Dependent,  Unaccountable Independent,  Accountable
14 Transparency  Low  High 
15  Alignment with Academics  Low  High   25
Table 4: Exchange Rate Volatility in Inflation Targeting and Control Countries 
 Nominal  Real 
Volatility Interval:  4 years  8 years  16 yrs  4 years  8 years  16 yrs 
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Figures tabulated are OLS coefficient estimates from regressions of exchange rate volatility on inflation targeting 
dummy.  Controls not reported but included: a) current account (as percentage of GDP, mnemonic 
BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS), b) natural logarithm of openness (trade as percentage of GDP, mnemonic 
NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS), c) log population (mnemonic SP.POP.TOTL), and d) log real PPP-adjusted GDP per capita 
(mnemonic NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD).  All series are averages of annual series from World Development Indicators. 
Intercept and comprehensive time controls also included but not reported. 
Regressand is effective exchange rate volatility, calculated as standard deviation of natural monthly logarithms.  
Nominal rate is IFS line “neu” or “nec”; real rate is IFS line “rec.” 
Standard errors recorded in parentheses; * (**) denotes significance at the .05 (.01) level.   26
Table 5: Sudden Stops in Inflation Targeting and Control Countries 
 
Table 5a: Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004) sudden stops 
  Control Obs.  IT Obs.  Pre-IT Obs.  Total 
Tranquil Obs.  64 93  119  276 
Sudden Stops  8 1 9  18 
Total  72 94  128  294 
 
 
Table 5b: Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2006) systematic sudden stops 
  Control Obs.  IT Obs.  Pre-IT Obs.  Total 
Tranquil Obs.  201 71 102  374 
Sudden Stops  9 1 6  16 
Total  210 72 108  390 
 
Table 5c: Eichengreen, Gupta and Mody (2006) sudden stops 
  Control Obs.  IT Obs.  Pre-IT Obs.  Total 
Tranquil Obs.  132 58  99 289 
Sudden Stops  8 2 9  19 
Total  140 60 108  308 
 
Table 5d: Frankel and Cavallo (2004) sudden stops 
  Control Obs.  IT Obs.  Pre-IT Obs.  Total 
Tranquil Obs.  400 127 148 675 
Sudden Stops  16 4 12  32 
Total  416 131 160 707 
 
Table 5e: Frankel and Wei (2004) sudden stops 
  Control Obs.  IT Obs.  Pre-IT Obs.  Total 
Tranquil Obs.  435 47 105  587 
Sudden Stops  20 1  3 24 
Total  455 48 108  611 
 
Table 5f: Hypothesis Tests 
Sudden Stop Def.  CIM (2004)  CIT (2006)  EGM (2006)  FC (2004) FW  (2004) 
Control=IT  2.9 (.00)  1.1 (.25)  .7 (.48)  .4 (.67)  .8 (.45) 
IT=pre-IT  -2.1 (.03)  -1.4 (.16)  -1.3 (.21)  -1.7 (.10)  -.3 (.80) 
T-tests and associated p-values. 
 
Note: “Pre-IT Obs.” refer to the post-1989 but pre-IT observations for countries that adopted IT within the sample.   27
Table 6: Key International Variables in Inflation Targeting and Control Countries 
 
Table 6a: M2/Reserves 
Averages  1990-93 1994-97 1998-01 2002-04 1990-97 1998-04 1990-04 
IT  10.2  11.1 6.3  5.6 10.8 5.6  5.8 
Control  8.7 5.2 5.2 4.4 6.1 4.9 5.5 
|t-test|  .4 1.7 .7  .9 1.4 .5  .2 
KS- P-value  .13 .02* .08  .07 .03* .28  .40 
 
Table 6b: Reserves in Months of Imports 
Averages  1990-93 1994-97 1998-01 2002-04 1990-97 1998-04 1990-04 
IT  2.9 3.1 3.6 4.2 3.1 4.1 4.1 
Control  3.5 3.3 3.8 5.0 3.3 4.3 3.8 
|t-test|  .8 .3 .4  1.1  .3 .4 .5 
KS P-value  .48 .87 .66 .41 .80 .58 .48 
 
Table 6c: Current Account, %GDP 
Averages  1990-93 1994-97 1998-01 2002-04 1990-97 1998-04 1990-04 
IT  -2.5  -1.6 .3  .4 -1.7 .4  .1 
Control  -.3 -1.8  -1.3 -.1 -1.5 -.7  -.9 
|t-test|  2.7*  .2  1.0  .3 .2 .7 .7 
KS P-value  .03*  .82 .63 .62 .74 .19 .75 
 
|t-test| denotes the absolute value of a t-test for the null hypothesis of equal means between IT and control group 
countries.  KS P-value denotes the probability for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the null hypothesis of equality 
of distributions between IT and countries. 
All series are averages of annual series from World Development Indicators: ratio of M2 to total reserves 
(FM.LBL.MQMY.IR.ZS); reserves in import months (FI.RES.TOTL.MO); and current account balance as % GDP 
(BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS).   28
Table A1: Inflation Targeting Countries through 2004 
  Default Start Date Conservative Start Date  Join EMU 
Australia  March, 1993 September, 1994  
Brazil  June, 1999 June, 1999  
Canada  February, 1991 January, 1992  
Chile  January, 1991 August, 1999  
Colombia  September, 1999 October, 1999  
Czech Republic  January, 1998 January, 1998  
Finland  February, 1993 January, 1994 January, 1999 
Hungary  June, 2001 August, 2001  
Iceland  March, 2001 March, 2001  
Israel  January, 1992 June, 1997  
Korea  April, 1998 April, 1998  
Mexico  January, 1999 January, 2001  
New Zealand  March, 1990 March, 1990  
Norway  March, 2001 March, 2001  
Peru  January, 2002 January, 2002  
Philippines  January, 2002 January, 2002  
Poland  September, 1998 September, 1998  
South Africa  February, 2000 February, 2000  
Spain  January, 1995 January, 1995 January, 1999 
Sweden  January, 1993 January, 1995  
Switzerland  January, 2000 January, 2000  
Thailand  May, 2000 May, 2000  
United Kingdom  October, 1992 October, 1992  
 
After 2004: 
Indonesia  July, 2005 
Romania  August, 2005 
Slovak Republic  January, 2005 
Turkey  January, 2006 
 
 
Histogram as of June 2006 
0-2 yrs  2-4 yrs  4-6 yrs  6-8 yrs  8-10 yrs  10-12 yrs  12-14 yrs  14+ 
4  5  7  2  3  4 
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Table A2: Control Group Countries, Exchange Rate Regime Switches and Frameworks  
  # LYS5   # RR   End-2004 Framework 
Algeria   6 2  Other 
Argentina   3 2  Other 
Belarus   7 0  Crawling  Peg 
Bulgaria   2 1  Currency  Board 
Cape Verde*  5  n/a  Fixed Exchange Rate 
China   0  2  Fixed Exchange Rate 
Costa Rica*  5 1  Crawling  Peg 
Croatia   8 1  Other 
Denmark   0  1  Fixed Exchange Rate 
Dominican Republic   8 2  Other 
Egypt   7 1  Monetary  Target 
Estonia*  0 1  Currency  Board 
Georgia   1 2  Other 
Guatemala   7  1  Other (transition to IT) 
Hong Kong, China   0 0  Currency  Board 
Indonesia   6  2  Monetary Target, Now IT 
Iran   5 2  Monetary  Target 
Jamaica*  11 5  Monetary  Target 
Japan   0 0  Other 
Jordan   5  2  Fixed Exchange Rate 
Kazakhstan   5 1  Other 
Latvia*  0  1  Fixed Exchange Rate 
Lebanon   3  2  Fixed Exchange Rate 
Lithuania*  2 1  Currency  Board 
Macao, China*  0 n/a  n/a 
Macedonia*  5  2  Fixed Exchange Rate 
Mauritius*  7 1  Monetary  Target 
Morocco   0  0  Fixed Exchange Rate 
Paraguay   11 2  Other 
Romania   9 2  Other,  Now  IT 
Russia   5 3  Other 
Singapore   9 1  Other 
Slovakia   8 3  Now  IT 
Slovenia*  6  1  Fixed Exchange Rate 
Syria   0  0  Fixed Exchange Rate 
Trinidad & Tobago*  9  n/a  Fixed Exchange Rate 
Tunisia   11 0  Crawling  Peg 
Turkey   6 2  Now  IT 
Ukraine   6  4  Fixed Exchange Rate 
Uruguay*  5 3  Monetary  Target 
USA   0 0  Other 
Venezuela   10  3  Fixed Exchange Rate 
* Indicates country with population greater than Iceland but less than New Zealand. 
# LYS Switches (# RR switches) is the number of exchange rate regime shifts between 1990 and 2004 (2001) using 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 5-regime (Reinhart-Rogoff) criteria. 
Framework is as of December 31, 2004 from IMF’s Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary 
Policy Frameworks.   30
Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1 In MonetaryProgramme of the NBS until the Year 2008 the National Bank of Slovakia defines its monetary policy 
as (p2): “Simultaneously, the NBS defines the conduct of its monetary policy as inflation targeting in the 
conditions of ERM II.” (bold in original); http://www.nbs.sk/MPOL/MPROG/2008A.PDF. 
2 http://www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAndResearch/Bulletin/bu_may99/bu_0599_2.pdf 
3 The dates are only significantly far apart in two cases: Chile (which maintained an exchange rate band along with 
its inflation target), Israel (which maintained a crawling exchange rate peg whose margins grew over time), and 
Mexico. 
4 http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/abeng/1-5eng.htm 
5 For Canada and Norway, see http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/backgrounders/bg-e2.html and http://www.norges-
bank.no/english/monetary_policy/faq/#interventions respectively.  For Israel, see 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap24p.pdf.  The British intervention was to assist the G7 in supporting the euro 
in September 2000.  See p 32 of Debt and Reserves Management Report 2006-07 available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/20C/37/bud06_dmo_282.pdf 
6 http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap24s.pdf.  Despite this, Calvo and Reinhart (2000) characterize New Zealand 
as having a “fear of floating.”  Calvo and Reinhart focus on the difference between de facto and de jure behavior of 
exchange rates using non-structural techniques, and do not consider separately the (small number of) IT countries 
that are in their sample. 
7 A number of IT countries have reduced the importance of the exchange rate (as either an indicator or target of 
monetary policy) over time, including Chile, Israel, New Zealand.  Alternatively, consider the countries pursuing 
inflation targeting according to the IMF’s de facto monetary policy classifications.  At the end of 2005 the inflation, 
there were: 2 countries with pegged exchange rates; 6 managed floaters; and 16 independent floaters.  See  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/2005/1205.htm. 
8 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, p87) wrote “The number of long-lived fixed exchange rates still remaining in the 
world today is remarkably small … The striking conclusion … is that, aside from some small tourism economies, oil 
sheikdoms and highly dependent principalities, literally only a handful of countries in the world today have 
continuously maintained tightly fixed exchange rates against any currency for five years or more.”  
9 Eichengreen (1996, p114) writes “… it was only when the foreign-exchange markets opened for business in 
January 1959, with the major currencies fully convertible for current-account transactions, that the Bretton Woods 
System can be said to have come into full operation.” 
10 The European Monetary System lasted from 1979 through the start of EMU in 1999, but only with a large number 
of realignments and crises, including the unceremonious withdrawal of the British pound and the Italian lira, 
surviving in the end only because the sterling and currency departures (and entries), and a remarkably wide 
fluctuation band of +/- 15%. 
11 Indeed, it is worth pointing out that eleven countries hit by recent currency crises have switched to inflation 
targeting (Brazil, Czech Republic, Finland, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, and 
the UK).  Of the countries hit by major currency crises since 1990, only Argentina, Malaysia and Russia have not 
adopted inflation targeting. 
12 Both Finland and Spain used IT during their drives to enter EMU, and had 1998 inflation targets of 2% which 
were slightly undershot.  
13 I use PWT6.1 data, for which 2000 is the last available year.  The Philippines was the poorest IT country in 2000 
with income per capita of $3400; Peru was next at $4600. 
14 Since EMU began half-way through the sample period, I do not include it or any EMU members in the control 
group.  I also drop developing countries in currency unions, six of which would otherwise qualify for membership in 
the control group (Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Panama, and Swaziland).  None of the results 
below are substantially affected if the six LDCs are included in the control group. 
15 Iceland had just over 280,000 people in 2000, while New Zealand had over 3.8 million; the third-smallest country 
was Norway with almost 4.5 million. 
16 Thus far, four countries in the control group (Indonesia, Romania, Slovakia, and Turkey) have adopted IT in 
2005-06. 
17 The IMF provides the framework as of December 31, 2004 in its “Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements 
and Monetary Policy Frameworks”; see http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/2004/eng/1204.htm    31
                                                                                                                                                             
18 In passing, exchange rate realignments (as e.g., occurred frequently during the EMS) are consistent with an 
unchanged exchange rate regime. 
19 The IMF reported de jure measures of exchange rate regimes until they switched in 1999 towards a more de facto 
based measure.  Using this data, I find that there have been 45 fixes of exchange rate from 1990 onwards.  Of these, 
23 have now ended.  Of the 22 that have not ended yet, there are three dollarizations (Ecuador, El Salvador, Timor 
Leste), and four European Currency Boards (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania).  There are also twelve young 
(since 2000) fixes (Belarus, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Pakistan, Solomon Islands, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam); these usually are associated with capital controls.  This leaves three 
other countries (China, Guinea-Bissau, Morocco), all of whom also have strong controls. 
20 For instance there are missing gaps in LYS for important countries like China and the UK.  Again: Reinhart and 
Rogoff cover the switches of Estonia and Latvia into current boards, whereas the LYS data begin after these dates. 
21 RR classify America as “freely floating” since February 1978 despite the change in operating procedures of 
October 1979.  They also classify Canada as maintaining a “De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to 
+/-2%” since June 1970, despite Canada’s switch to IT. 
22 In their IMF Working Paper 02/155 “The Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes Since 1990: Evidence from De 
Facto Policies” Andrea Bubula and Inci Ötker-Robe construct a monthly data set for the de facto exchange rate 
regimes of all IMF members between 1990 and 2001.  Their classification delivers regime switches that are typically 
between LYS5 and RR; the mean number of year-end regime switches for BÖ-R/LYS5/RR are 2.2/4.8/1.5 while 
medians are 2/5/1.  Eight countries had no regime switches according to BÖ-R, while there were ten and seven with 
LYS5 and RR respectively. 
23 The other countries currently in the same IMF classification are the Dominican Republic, Liberia, and Papua New 
Guinea. 
24 The maximal survivorship rate at eight years in Table 2 is .39 (for the LYS 3-way regime, allowing each country 
to have only the regime with which it started the sample.  If we treat the nine IT countries that began at least eight 
years ago independently, this would be expected to happen with probability (.39)
9≈.0002.  Other survivorship 
assumptions or exchange rate classifications lower this number still further. 
25 Since IT regimes share a number of common features that differ from other monetary policies, I do not speculate 
on the reason(s) for this durability.  This is a fruitful area for future research. 
26 Indeed, countries with fixed exchange rates (such as China) are more likely now to be viewed as suspiciously 
manipulating their rates than floaters, another contrast with the Bretton Woods period. 
27 Eichengreen (1996, p135) states “That this [Bretton Woods] system functioned at all is testimony to the 
international cooperation that operated in its support.” 
28 Since my focus in this paper is on the international aspects of inflation targeting, I do not consider domestic issues 
like growth, inflation, and banking crises. 
29 Some observations are missing, since countries started IT well after the start of the sample.  Thus e.g., Brazil does 
not contribute observations to either the group of countries before it starts IT in 1999. 
30 This makes country-specific fixed effects estimation infeasible, since no country experiences a regime change.  
Thus this test relies on cross-sectional variation. 
31 The data on the control variables are only available through the end of 2004, so that the regressand and regressor 
are sometimes not aligned perfectly.  This is probably of negligible importance, since the regressor tend to add little 
explanatory power and are highly autoregressive in any case. 
32 For instance, developing countries in particular may find it difficult to adopt IT because of problems with: fiscal 
dominance, imperfect central bank independence, and weak financial systems. 
33 Parenthetically, I note in passing that no inflation targeter has ever, to the best of my knowledge, experienced a 
banking crisis.  Ho and von Hagen (2004) review dates of banking crises from eight studies and create their own; 
none of the countries with long IT regimes (Australia, Canada, Chile, Israel, New Zealand, Sweden, and the UK) 
experienced a banking crisis during inflation targeting.  Kroszner et al (2006) delivers the same message. 